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I got into the water field in 1962 because Resources For
the Future (RFF) wanted a new gun to perform a systems
analysis  of the Army Corps of Engineers latest plan for
developing the water resources of the Potomac Basin.
Irving Fox was the perpetrator of the scheme to critique
the Corps’ work  and Gilbert White's work  on the range of
choice in floodplain management was to be the guiding
theme for the stud y.  John K rutilla at RFF  and Otto
Eckstein  at Harvard were my intellectual mentors, and
Allen Kneese gave of his leadership so it should come as
no surprise that I  soon became steeped in the minutiae of
benefit-cost (B/C ) analysis.
Thus my career in water resources began.  The career has
not yet terminated nor have I, although I have found
myself  on opposite sides of issues from some powerful
potential enemies.  I never intended  to have a  career in
water resources but once having wet my feet, I found the
issues too fascinating to be ignored.
In 1962 I thought that our insights about the powerful
advantages of making choices from a broad range of
options and the vast importance of adequate project
evaluation were so overwhelmingly clear that by the end
of my car eer, the w orld wo uld hav e fallen in to line with
our faith and w e would  go on to greater progress.  This, of
course, was the Progressive Vision, the Gospel of
Efficiency, that had perva ded my  education as a
conservationist and as an economist.  It was a vision that
was found throu ghout W ashington in the 1 960s.  Science
and Gover nmen t and righ t-minde d public o fficials wou ld
make the world a safe and beneficent place.
The 1960s were  a part of the period Marion Clawson has
called the era of managem ent on the public lands.  In
water  resource s  it was  the be ginning of the end of the
big projects.  In no sm all part this  was because, as Walter
Langb ein has pointed out, the nation had run out of the
most   efficient dam sites.  This meant that if there ever
had been an economically efficient water resource
development  project, it had already been  built, perhaps
in the preceding century.  We were left with the dogs
which were ama zingly easy  to tear apart with a competent
econo mic ana lysis. 
That was why we at Resou rces for the Future were ab le to
show through systems analysis that there were many
superior alternatives to the Corps of Engineers plan for
many dams in the Potomac basin, if costs alone were the
criterion and maintenance of dissolved oxygen in the
estuary was the objective of planning.  Later, Steve Hanke
and I were able to show that given the ability to price
water seasonally at its marginal costs, the water storage
projects  were an unneeded solution for the Washington,
D.C. water supply p roblems.   Daniel Sheer, an
independent consultant, and Bob McGarry, the head of the
Washington Suburb an Sanita ry Com mission, w ere able in
the 1980s by involving all of the players and some sharp
analysts, to put into place a water supply plan for the
Washington, D.C. area that depended heavily on systems
analysis, pricing, and a min imum of water storage and
emergency water treatm ent.  Occasio nally the progressive
vision works.
By the 1970s en vironmen talists had caught on to the
econo mists tricks and were u sing a combination of
economics and environmental analysis to oppose water
resources projects.  The Environmental Defense Fund and
the Natural Resource Defense Council were probably the
most  diligent users o f this tactic.  The y successf ully
delayed a number of projects or forced them to be revised.
We all learned from the se experiences that water
resources projects are seldom killed outr ight but o nly
delayed indefinitely.
When  I was a stud ent at Ohio State University in the
postwar ‘40s, our textbooks on conservation gene rally
celebrated the visions of water resources engineers.  The
pinnacle  of vision was the North American Water and
Power Alliance (NAWAPA) plan for diverting waters of
the Yukon.  By the time I arrived in Washington in the
1960s, NAWAPA  was slowly being killed, but before I
left Wash ington in  the 1980s it had flickered back to life.
Perhaps someday we will be pan icked into  believing that
we should bring water from the Yukon to the Southwest
and the upper Midwest as NAWAPA envisioned.
I have learned that we are slow to pick up innovative ideas
if those ideas represent a change in the way we think
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about problem s and if they  require ch anges in  behavioral
patterns of the institutions that man age water resou rces.
The water users may be much more responsive to new
ideas than are the managers, perhaps because the
managers operate secure monopolies.  It should be
indisputa ble that the solution adopted for Washington,
D.C.’s water supply problems was light years ahead of
traditional solutions.  W hile I was tea ching at th e Ohio
State University about ten years ago I gave an invited
public  lecture on water supply management in which I
extolled the virtues of the Washington, D.C. water supply
plan.  At this time the Columbus, Ohio, water department
was fighting strenuously for more water storage to meet
projected deman ds, and v ehem ently resisting  all
suggestions for adjustin g water ra tes to reflect m arginal
costs for projecting dem ands with realistic sensitivity to
prices or for dro ught emergency planning and water
conservation measures.  It was a sobering experience.
At the beginning of the 1970s and again at the end of the
decade the Principles and Standards (P&S)  were revised.
Both  revisions were under the auspices of the Water
Resources Council.  In 1970 and 1971, the revisions were
driven by advances in benefit-cost techniques coming out
of the work  of Eckste in, Krutilla ,  McKean, and other
critics of the procedu res in and out of g overnm ent.  Those
revisions were a m ajor imp rovem ent but the y left certain
outside economists, primarily the efficienc y advocates,
dissatisfied and still critical.  On th e other side , one cou ld
find those who emph asized income redistribution and
multiobjective analysis being critical of the efficiency
advocates.   The environmental interests were  quick to
criticize the generosity of the new ru les in certain  respects
and began an attack on water resources development that
culminated in a further revision and t ightening of the P&S
at the end o f the Carte r admin istration.  Once again, a
prominent group of economists, this time under the
imprimatur of two national environ mental organ izations,
found the new procedures short  on rigor, albeit improved.
During the mid 1970s I began a ten year odyssey in the
Office of the Secretary of the Interior that acquainted me
with both the comedy and the tragedy of the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation water storage and irrigation p rojects in  the
western states.  My introduction to comedy came in a
dispute  with the Bureau’s economists over the correct
treatment of the opportunity costs of farm labor.  We in
the Secretary’s office wanted to include them in  the
national accounts as an efficiency cost when calculating
the net benefits of irrigation agriculture.  To exclude them
would  inflate benefits unrealistically, we supposed.  The
Bur eau's  economists took the opposite tack.  To include
the opportunity costs of farm family labor would
unnec essarily dim inish the be nefits of the p roject.
We thought it appropriate to omit the opportunity costs of
family  labor in the ability to pay calculations which the
Bureau goes thro ugh on  each pro ject because they were
not out of pocket costs affecting the farmer's budget.  The
Bureau economists disagreed, arguing that not to include
those opp ortun ity co sts wo uld u nfair ly inf late th e farm er's
repayment requirements.  After this the Bureau's
econo mists considered us to b e enemies o f reclamation.
We concluded they were the enemies of reason and were
never again surprised at anything they did.
Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert  (1986) exposed the
underb elly of the Reclamation program.  His book
popularized the work of econ omists w ho had  spent, or in
some cases terminated, careers critiquing Bureau of
Reclamation projects.  We had our own opportunity to
examine the Reclamation Program about ten years before
Reis ner's  book.  In the early days of the Carter
administration the Interior Department, at the instigation
of the Solicitor ’s Office, p ublished  draft regu lations
enforcing the 160 acre limitation with residency
requirements on fe dera l irriga tion p rojec ts.  Inte rior's
failure to  enforce  the limitation  had bee n whip ped into  a
scandal by Ralp h Nade r’s group .  Carter’s ap pointees to
Interior had not forgotten the Nader study and cho se this
issue for one of their first actions.
  
The California growers, who were pa rticularly vu lnerable
to enforcement of the 160 acre limitation and the
residency requirem ent, prom ptly hit the Departm ent with
a National Environm ental Prote ction Ac t (NEPA ) suit
requiring an environmental impact statement on the
proposed regulations.  Because the regulations were more
econo mic than  environ mental,  the study o f their imp acts
would  have to be an economic study.  Economists were
sudden ly in dem and.  Ou r econo mic staff teamed  up with
econo mists from th e Agricultural R esearch S ervice to
launch a major study of the economics of federal
reclamation projects.  This study occupied the last three of
the Carter years and was issued as a draft environmental
impact statemen t by the Se cretary of  the Interior , Cecil
Andrus,  on the eve of his departure.  The acreage
limitation became the problem of the Reagan
administration.
One of James Watt’s first actions as Reagan’s  Secretary
of the Interior was to submit a bill, thoughtfully drafted by
the California agricultural interests, to enlarge the acreage
limitation to 960 acres.  Much of the remainder of
Reagan's first term, upon passage of the bill, was spent
refining regulation s to impose the 960 acre limitatio n with
artfully  crafted loopholes that would keep the large,
extended family farms, some of whom were corpo rations,
intact.  And so, from Nader to Carter to Reagan, the 160
acre limitation was replaced by the 960 acre limitation
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which, like its prede cessor, w as not m eant to am ount to
much when it counted.  To the populists in the Carte r
administration, the 160 acre limitation was meant to keep
project farmers in equitable poverty.  In the Reagan
Administration market forces were meant to determine the
scale of project agriculture.
The study of Reclamation projects prompted by the
attempt to impose acreage limitations on project farmers
revealed some of the tragedy in the Reclamation program.
In the 19th century movement that brought on the 1902
Reclamation Act, sentiment and inspiration had long since
replaced rigorous logic an d a record of so lid
accomplishment in irrigation p rojects.  Spea ker C anno n's
only  comment on Rep. N ewland s’ Bill was th at “the cost
of reclama tion wo uld ultim ately be m et from th e
Treasury.” The Progressive and positive view of the state
supported the Reclamation program for most of the
twentieth  century w ith now and then a grumble from
fiscal conservatives.  Now, looking back, it app ears that a
negative view of the state, wherein free riders are able to
force others to p ay for the ir free rides, is m ore in tun e with
history.
Stanley Roland Davison, who must have grown up on a
reclamation project, pe rhaps in  Montana where he earned
B.S. and M.S. d egrees, wrote a rem arkable thesis at
Berkeley in 1951 on “The Leadership of the Reclamation
Mov emen ts” (published in 1979 by Arno Press).  He
observed that  the gainers of  the program were a few
hundred farmers “and the ir reward  was to  be poverty and
hardship for a generation.”  Our acreage limitation study
revealed that 90 percent of the ownerships and 75 percent
of the farm operations were at 160 acres or less in 18
districts selected as representative case studies.  About
half the districts w ere into low  and m edium value crops
like forage and cereals  and the rest had liberal amounts of
higher value crops, cotton , vegetables, and fru its.
Existing farms at th e 160 acre scale were paying around
$10,000 annually to family  labor, man agem ent, and e quity
in districts with low value cro ps and up  to $20,00 0 in
districts with me dium v alue crop s.  Only in d istricts with
specialty  crops did residual returns rise much above
$25,000 on the smaller farms.  Beginning farmers
required  two to  five times the 160 acre limit to approach
breakeven in all types of districts except where the
specialty crops were grown.
  
The dismal economics of the projects were driven home
by an analy sis of repayment.  It is now widely understood
that districts  are  held  responsible only  for  their  share
of project costs without interest.  This subsidy amounted
to 97 percent of the full cost of irrigation in the wo rst case
and 57 percent of the full cost in the best case for the 18
districts.  The poorest d istricts have n ot even b een able to
meet their paym ent sched ules on the se genero us terms.
We discover ed that in  Mon tana, a state w ith short growing
seasons and remote markets, the districts have been
excused by Congress from any repayment requirement
except to pay what they can each y ear.
One needs to digest the se finding s in order to  apprecia te
the observation that Reclamation consigned families to  a
generation of hardsh ip and po verty.  Ha rdship an d pove rty
prevail today in the more northerly districts where the
operators give the appearance o f being trapped  because
there are no buyers for their equity .  It may be  that all this
misses the point that was made to me by Jimmy  Carter’s
Commissioner of Reclamation, an Idahoan, who told me
that the real pu rpose of th e projects is  to provide a decent
place to raise a family.  Perhaps growing up in poverty
and hardship makes the A merican character.
In addition to  the acreag e limitation, the Carter
administration launched tw o other majo r initiatives in
water resources.  One was the “hit list” in which 19 water
resource projects were exp osed as wanting  in econo mic
and environ mental ju stification.  The other initiative, as
mentioned earlier, was once again to revise the P&S.
Both  actions reflected the adoption by environmental
activists in the White H ouse of lessons learned from using
econom ic logic to shoot dow n water resourc es projects.
The hit list was inspired by an accumulation of econ omic
critiques from the ‘60s and ‘70s of authorized water
projects  which w ere inherit ed by Carter.  The
environ mentalists  in the White House struck early and
secretly.  Cecil  Andrus, Carter's newly appointed
Secretary of the Interior was hit with the hit list as he
debarked from an airplane on a western trip.  He had
trouble  defending t he  W hite House.  On that trip he was
also to learn of the disastrous effect the hit list would have
on the Adm inistration’s p olitical standin g in the W est.
Carter commented later on ho w this disaste r tied his  hands
in water po litics for the rest of his administration and
affected his campaign for reelection.
The revision of the P&S at the end of Carter
administration reflected the cumulative identification of
weaknesses in the rigor of the  1972 P &S.  The executive
order directing the revision identified specific
shortcomings in the procedures and directed they be fixed.
In a fit of excessive zeal, the new P&S were to be issued
as regulations, effectively making performance of
agencies under th e P&S  litigable.  The weaknesses were
mostly  f ixed and the Reagan administration retained the
new P& S as rules, not as regulation s.
In the 20 years that have passed since 1979 much has
happened to benefit-cost analysis.  The Corps of
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Engineers has mo ved into e cosystem  restoration  and is
asking how su ch projec ts are to be ev aluated.  There is a
strong inclination by ecosystem scientists to evaluate a
restoration by the qualitative state of the ecosystem
restored rather than  by the flow  of services  created w ith
and without the restoratio n.  Clearly the quantitative flow
of services is needed by the utilitaria n B/C  analysts, w hile
the ideology of conservation biology is qualitative.
Anoth er trend o bservab le in Corps of Engineers practice
is “stakeholder” involvement or “shared vision”
processes,  the development of which Leonard Shabman
has contributed to in his work for the Corps.  How does
one evaluate the outco me of the sh ared vision planning
process?   Shared v ision is stakeholder driven and not
expert driven as are the traditional planning process and
benefit-cost  analysis but shared vision does depend upon
software which facilitates the  process.  T he softw are is
setup by experts and contains externally generated
information.
Traditional benefit-cost an alysis has riv als not only  in
multiobjective analysis, but also in environ mental q uality
analysis  and the shared vision analy sis.  An eco nomic
efficiency advoca te is inclined to think that there are a set
of criteria that would rank these approaches but such a set
of criteria w ould  have to be derived from one or another
of the competing ideologie s and this ru ns into  the trap of
circularity.  Lacking independent performance criteria and
lacking canonical law, we evaluate what we do by what
we do, as Wildavsky said, because we do not know how
to evaluate what we produce.
The Corps of Engineers chooses to muddle along using a
bit of each methodological idea, neither co mpletely
satisfying nor com pletely alienating its supporters and
critics.  And, of course, it continues to finance generous
quantities of methodological studies by academics and
contractors.  The idea that efficiency gains from  a public
water resource investment should be counted  in a national
income account is not dead, bu t the econ omists  who have
taken  the ef ficien cy ad voca te's position (that a utilitarian
B/C  analysis should be  applied to pub lic expenditures)
appear to be putting fingers in the dike in hopes of
preven ting the ine vitable delu ge.  It is a losing  effort.
Efficiency advocates have another choice.  They can
advoc ate greater cost sharing and a larger role  for private
investm ent.  The drive for greater and more consistent
cost sharing, which Carter initiated, gathered steam in the
Reagan administrat ion and hit  the same wall that stymies
utilitarian benefit-cost: the pressure of rent seekers or free
riders.
A greater role for private investment has yet to be given
a fair shot but perhaps conditions are becoming m ore
favorable.  Consid er the situation  in 1907 when William
Howard  Taft cou ld say with reference to the Grand Valley
project in Colorado that “there are a good many
enterprises that involve the outlay of capital so large or
require so much risk that it is better th at, associated  with
private  enterprise, the government help, too . . . .”  In fact,
private  enterprise had tried and failed to bring water to the
Valley.  The government project ended up costing far
more than was estimated because of the same engineering
difficulties that had defeated  the private efforts.
Now consider whether a President could make such a
claim today about water resource projects when there are
many firms of a size that can and do take on large and
risky projects, if there is a positive expected payout.  As
evidence, there are reports that Enron is approaching cities
along the Rio Grande offering to manage regional water
plans and provide water supplies without taking irrigated
land out of production.  What Taft should have said,
perhaps,  and which would surely be echoed today, is that
“there are a goo d man y enterpr ises so bad  that only
government is will ing to undertake them.”  As an
efficiency advocate,  I would prefer  to see private f irms
take a much larger hand in dealing with our water
resource problem s.  None o f the classic  rationale for
public  involvement holds m uch wa ter any lon ger.  I once
heard Abel Wolman tell a group of engineers and planners
that if they eve r got a cha nce to  build a dam, do it!  I now
think better advice would be that, if there is ever an
oppor tunity to pr ivatize a pu blic water f unction , do it!
